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The aim of this paper is to provide an elucidation of what, at first sight, appears as a 
specific and negative affective phenomenon, namely that of revenge, which although 
its sinister popularity risks constantly to be muddled with a simple state of excitement 
deprived of intentionality or with a kind of “ justice without justice”. The understanding 
of the nature of revenge and of impulse of revenge allows to enlighten a peculiar feeling’s 
class, to which revenge in a certain sense belongs to, and to investigate the meaning and 
the sense of Scheler’s ambiguous term “Vergeltung” in order to attribute to retributive 
model of justice, by a comparison with revenge, its correct role and place in the world of 
Scheler’s. Our back-idea is the one, according to which, refining sensibility to injustices 
can contribute to a primary form of identity, namely that of our living body.   
WHen tHe FACts “CALL DoWn VenGeAnCe”. 
FeeLInG oF ReVenGe, sensIbIILIty to 
InJUstICes AnD  
(A HInt At) RetRIbUtIVe JUstICe  
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Revenge! What is it? How do we recognize it? Are there only revenges 
towards the others or are there self-revenges too? Is it possible to “prevent” 
revenge, avoiding e.g. that a simple pulse tendency could flow into an 
irreparable gesture? 
in the moments of grave economical and social crisis, in which the formal 
equality of the political, social and juridical rights risks constantly to be (and in 
actual fact it is) belied by real power relations, when an evident contradiction 
(such as this) favours, namely, and foments crawling forms of ressentiment1, it is 
more than ever important to reflect upon this negative phenomenon that often 
constitutes, among other things, the starting-point of the ressentiment. moving 
from Scheler’s account of revenge and from disquieting analogy (that is not 
identity) of this attitude to a specific juridical model – the retributive model 
- i would like to provide a contribute to the studies on theories of emotions, 
1 i am clearly referring to the scheler’s Theory of ressentiment and to its sociological 
relevance. see scheler (19725 b, 37-38). The short inquiry about the revenge, that I want here to 
make, constitutes a part of a more vast work dedicated to the phenomenon of ressentiment of 
which i presented some results on the occasion of The Xii international max Scheler Conference, 
organized by the max scheler gesellschaft e by the nordamerikanische max-scheler-
gesellschaft, “wurzeln der Technikphilosophie. max schelers Technik- und Zivilisationskritik 
in unterschiedlichen gesellschaftlichen Kontexten” (universität erfurt, Theologische fakultät, 
22-25 May 2013).
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rigoletto
(con impeto, volto al ritratto)
Sì, vendetta, tremenda vendetta,
di quest’anima è solo desio...
di punirti già l’ora s’affretta,
Che fatale per te tuonerà.
Come fulmine scagliato da dio
Te colpire il buffone saprà. 
gilda
O mio padre, qual gioia feroce
Balenarvi negli occhi vegg’io!
Perdonate...a noi pure una voce
di perdono dal cielo verrà...
(g. Verdi, rigoletto)
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uncovering the peculiar affective relevance of revenge, and a very short lexical 
explanation.2 let’s start just from this last point.
scheler’s term “Vergeltung” in fact, that i translated into italian as 
“Retribuzione” (the English equivalent of which is “Retribution”), is not 
immediately translatable into other languages just owing to its semantic 
polyvalence: “indemnity” for damages, or rather, for wrongs; “recompense”; 
“revenge”; “reprisal” etc. in short, i decided for “retribution” because a 
fundamental (but not the one and only) element that marks “Vergeltung”, 
in scheler’s sense too, is “to give somebody tit for tat”3, or “to pay somebody 
in their own coin”. and it is just this element of proportional punishment of 
“Vergeltung” as juridical model that is shared – in Scheler’s approach to penalty 
- from genuine “revenge”. so, original “revenge”, that presents itself as one of the 
meaning of scheler’s “Vergeltung”, is indicative of an attempt to punish certainly 
the offender, but in an act not deprived of an element of justice, that is to say, in 
line at least with the law of retaliation: “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth”. 
i think that to enlighten the relationship, even though distant, that subsists 
between criminal justice (vital, and not moral justice, as we will seen) and revenge 
can have an interesting implication. it makes evident the fact that revenge is not 
reducible to a senseless event and, as a consequence, cannot be undervalued as a 
suddenly explosion of anger. Although it cannot be justified, especially in its very 
serious criminal versions, has always at least an appearance of reason, or it claims 
to be somehow “just”, otherwise is not a “revenge”, but something else. with due 
caution that the different outlook (from reality to fiction) involves, this crucial 
aspect of revenge explains the sympathy that each and every one of us, especially 
children, may feel towards genuine and good avengers, idealistic and somewhat 
romantic, founded in fictions or in films like Zorro.
 Zorro reveals the importance of the sensibility to injustices, to wrongs 
and, remaining in the boundaries of a genuine justice felt at axiological 
and affective level, shows the threshold beyond which the “good” becomes 
indeed “bad” and “evil”, and the “justice” becomes “injustice”. 
investigating the nature of revenge, on the other hand, allows the 
understanding of the limits that this experience has, apart from its 
pretensions, and to determine the relations, not always “naïf”, that it 
establishes eventually with acts, sometimes contextual to it, of which we 
need to appraise the value’s importance and the role that they play in the 
possible refinement of affective sensibility. More explicitly: are there any 
acts axiologically superior to revenge and thus able to defeat revenge itself 
2 In this context I can only to hint at the question of “Vegeltung” in Scheler’s retributive term 
with which i am concerning just in relation to “ressentiment”.
3  Scheler (20098, 362).
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and the virulence of the grudge or of any other negative feeling states and 
states of excitement that may accompany it? 
Answering affirmatively to this question could also mean, in my opinion, 
that we do not necessarily have to resign ourselves to the so considered 
classic nietzsche’s thesis, according to which
 «all instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly turn inward.»44
if it is possible e.g. that a person renounces to take revenge for the wrongs, 
renouncing consequently to do evil, in its turn, to its evil-doer or to some 
members of the evil-doer’s family or of society who have some friendly relation 
to it, then that person has not inevitably to do evil to itself. i mean to say that we 
must not generalize the idea that an unsuccessful, or rather, not wanted any more 
act of revenge (towards the others), is transformed into a kind of masochism - at 
least where exist personal resources to escape from instincts of species and from 
automatisms of the body and, in the worst hypothesis, from an anonymous and 
fragmentary body (a sum of cells, organs or atomistic sensations) that answers 
only to sensorial solicitations. So, to cultivate our affective sensibility – if this 
training process is plausible – means cultivate in the first place our body in order 
to refinement the vital self-sense, because our individuality and our capability 
of truthfulness begin exactly from here: from our living body and from way of 
making a correct experience of it in the world among others. 
i would like to say, in the sign of Zorro, that it is possible „to execute the revenge“, 
to kill every raising revenge, particularly when it is indeed a „bad“ revenge, 
and to learn to feel the value-differences and the value-nuances (good, bad, 
evil, violent, innocent, just etc.); to feel, too, real wickedness and injustice in 
order to fight them. Like Zorro.    
revenge is a “dish best served cold “; it is “bitter” or crossed every now 
and then by a gleam of “wild joy“. certain persons really have “thirst for 
revenge” or they have a strong “desire for revenge”. other persons “harbour 
thoughts of revenge”. The spilled blood “calls down vengeance” and it 
sounds like a paradox, but even “justice rights wrongs”. 
all these are popular expressions, of course; a lively language and a little 
metaphorical that finds out, nevertheless, some truths. It is true, for 
instance – and contemporary empirical research, in particular cognitive 
psychology, confirms it - that revenge is a sensory-vital phenomenon. 
although the “hunger”, restrained in order to best relish the dish, the 
“thirst” and the “desire” or appetites do not allude certainly to some form 
4 Nietzsche (19942, 2, Section 16).
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of cannibalism and have not just a literal meaning, they open a universe of 
tastes, of primitive and complex, rather ambiguous, pleasures and emotions, 
like the “wild joy“ or similar emotions like that german language calls 
“schadenfreude”, that refers at least to a being endowed with a body and 
with particular cognitivo-emotional states and reactions. it is well-known, 
moreover, in the world of art, and wisely employed by film techniques 
and by all times literature, the “noir” character of revenge. so it is an 
expression of the living-body, and more exactly, of an individual of whom 
revenge reveals the behavioural dimension and his potentially criminality. 
certain facts besides, like homicides, above all those particularly violent, 
“calls down vengeance” and there are “crimes”, so to speak, “that cry to 
god for vengeance”. This aspect is very important because it seems to point 
to a real object of vengeance and of rising vengeance, that is to say, of the 
impulse of revenge (racheimpuls). in other words, genuine revenge or driving 
tendencies for revenge would have an intentional character that would 
exclude every possible attempt to identify this emotional experience with a 
simple, deprived of intentionality, sensory affection or with a mere state of 
excitement (affekt) like ire or anger. 
according to scheler retributive Theory of Punishement (rTP)5, we can 
define this aspect of revenge, that approaches it dangerously to a primitive 
forme of justice, 
“istance” or «demande for atonement»6.
refering to a “third entity” above the harmed person and the evil doer (god 
or same Judge), this aspect would seem to confirm, at the same time, the 
strange connection that the popular language glimpses between revenge 
and justice – a peculiar type of justice (“justice rights wrongs”).
if on one hand revenge evokes, in the collective imaginary, at least the 
big deed of an avenger even if not that of a real judge or that of a moral 
ruler of the world, on the other hand revenge, in its milder version, evokes 
forgiveness - as gilda reminds us in rigoletto. an act, that of forgiveness, that 
from the religious point of view can come out of a strong faith, but from the 
moral or also only from the psychological point of view can come out of a 
long maturation’s process and of a deep meditation, often suffered. 
The question of forgiveness, of when and how the victim can forgive 
5  Cf. Scheler (20098, 355-369).
6  Scheler (20098, 363).
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the offender or the guilty; the question, in other words, of the cognitive 
modulators of forgiveness and of factors that make this process easier or make 
it difficult, is the hard core of the present psychological and psychoanalytic 
research.7 it is in the ambit of this important debate in which are discussed, 
besides, the therapeutic relevance of forgiveness and the theory of forgiveness 
as «indemnity for damages» and as contrary attitude to revenge and 
ressentiment8; it is just in this context, that emerges clearly, even though at 
empirical level, a very crucial problem that scheler himself has faced on 
moral plan or on that of psychological phenomenology. i am referring to 
the problem of axiological illusions.9 There are, in fact – limiting ourselves 
to forgiveness or to acts, as repentance, often involved in meditation that 
can flow into forgiveness – cases of «pseudo-forgiveness».10 it is possible to 
forgive the offender only for reasons, for instance, absolutely extrinsic in 
comparison with personal and genuine way of feeling: obligations or moral 
imperatives without inner participation and without axiological contents; 
masked forms of revenge as the popular language again reveals (“forgiveness 
is the revenge of the magnanimous”) etc. analogously, it is possible to confuse 
repentance with «painful effects and subsequent displeasure which result 
from excessive enjoyment»1111 or to live repentance as a kind of self-revenge 
or self-punishment.12 in scheler’s meaning of terms, it is a matter in these 
cases of “illusions”, “deceptions”, of “false” moral experiences whose falsehood 
depends either on «axiological blindness»13, so to speak, or – at level of explicit 
conscience - on hypocrisy and conscious and genuine lies. 
in this world of “crimes and misdeed”, of little or big illusions; in this web 
of lies and potential revenges, of revenges won by possible forgiveness and 
repentances; in this world, as it is outlined, and in which justice is often 
invoked, results evident the thin line that crosses, and not seldom connects 
(as consequences or premisses14, or else in those rare istants that have the 
extraordinary lihghtness of the grace), the pointed affective and conscience 
phenomenons: revenge, justice, forgiveness and repentance. in my opinion, 
they plunge their roots in that original experience of the life that, in normal 
conditions, is always “mine” or “yours”, and always meant as a unity.   
7  See Barcaccia, Mancini (2013).
8  Barcaccia, Mancini (2013, 74).
9  see scheler (19725 a).
10  Barcaccia, Mancini (2013, 98-99).
11  scheler (1973, 177).
12  Scheler (20006, 31).
13 Scheler (19725 a, 265)
14  like in the simple way of saying: “if you say you’re sorry, i’ll forgive you”. it alludes to 
a general - even not necessary – rule, in accordance to which the forgiveness of the victim 
presupposes the repentance of the offender. 
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All intuitions of the common sense have to find, of course, a genuine 
phenomenological verification or denial (via Scheler), and perhaps – even 
if not necessarily - an empirical verification or denial in the following 
analysis. Now it is possible to define precisely the programmatic lines of 
the present inquiry about this particular emotional phenomenon in which 
consists the revenge. 
one of the aims of this paper is not only to provide an elucidation of revenge 
but also, indirectly, to shed light upon a specific feeling’s class, namely 
that of the vital reaction answers or responses (Vitaleantwortsreaktion) of 
behavioural’s type. following scheler, particularly his Theory of emotions, 
we will uncover in fact that revenge is really an emotion and belongs, in 
a certain sense, to the group of feeling in question; to the same group, to 
which belongs among other things, in its positive or negative valence, “to be 
glad or to be sad about something”15 too. 
a necessary step to make so as not to draw rash conclusions is to try 
to understand what revenge is not. let us put to interest scheler’s 
extraordinary and very thin analysis of emotional life and of the so-called 
“ombres de l’âme”16 in order to circumscribe this vital phenomenon. 
Revenge is a little neglected in scientific literature on Scheler’s thought; 
nevertheless it witnesses, with its very presence in major scheler’s works, 
how this singular phenomenologist had seriously reflected on it, on life – 
including its ambiguities – and on embodied human existence.
 In the first place we have got to distinguish revenge from other experiences, 
above all affective, in order to catch its nature and its specificity; in the 
second place we have to state more exactly the analogies and the differences 
that subsist between revenge and retribution (Vergeltung).
The fact that revenge or an impulse of revenge cannot coincide with a 
sensory affection is evident of course. Provided that we take a glance, in 
scheler’s terms, at main essential traits of a sensory affection, we realize 
that it would mean really “to slap the experience” – as Scheler could say - to 
affirm the contrary. A sensory affections, like a sensory pain and a sensory 
agreeableness, in fact is17:
a. Extended and localized in specific parts of our body;
b. given essentially as a state, namely, lacks every form of intentionality;
15  Cf. e.g. Scheler (20098, 118, 264)
16  scheler is a real pioneer of research on “philosophy of negative emotions” too. on “ombres 
de l’âme” see at present Tappolet, Teroni, Konzelman Kiv, eds. (2013). On ressentiment, envy, 
jealousy, thirst for revenge see Waldenfels (2006, 275-296).
17  Scheler (20098, 335-340).
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c. has not relation to the person and is related only indirectly to the ego and to the 
living body seen as whole (in its “unity-identity”);
d. an actual fact;
e. punctual, without duration or continuity of sense;
f. among all feelings, the one least disturbed by attention;
g. subjet to practical and arbitrary changes.
even if we consider only a single characteristic among these, e.g. (a.), we can 
exclude that revenge is a sensory affection. a person does not feel revenge 
in specific parts of its body, as it feels e.g. the bite of a mosquito, but it is 
completely the revenge’s pray. so the “wild joy“, that this individual can 
betray, is a joy of all its living body.
less intuitive is the idea that revenge is not simply a vital feeling. how can 
we set up the claim to make of revenge something else from a sense of our 
body (lebensgefühl), as state, and from a vital sense (lebensgefühl), as function? 
if revenge is not a simple feeling of well-being or unwell and appears 
rather as a more complex attitude or as an inclination of human beings 
etc., it shares, in its bearer, with the well-being or the unwell «a unitary 
consciousness»18 of the living body «from whose totality separate organic 
sensations and feelings emerge only secondarily from the background, a 
it were, that founds them»19. from this point of view, an individual which 
makes experience of a vital pulse tendency to revenge can feel that this 
body with determinate characteristics, able to react so an so, to advance 
the satisfaction that could derive from its action, is exactly “its” living body, 
and not the body of an another person. The so-called “appetite” of that 
individual can never reduce itself to a function as the appetite in literal 
sense because is not a mere vital function, but has surely a nuance really 
psychological and a more cognitive character tied exactly to its definite 
object. 
unlike a vital sense, revenge refers more directly to ego; an aspect this, that 
approaches it to a purely psychic feeling, as a joy or as sadness of the “soul”, 
from which, however, it distinguishes itself for its more strictly tie with life, 
as the “wild joy”, that can accompany a criminal intention, reveals in its 
refer to a living for certain aspects still instinctive like an animal.
like a vital sense, revenge is always directed toward an object: in all cases 
of familiar feud, too, or in those of blood-revenge, when e.g. a member of 
the same family of the offender is shot, is always the same object to which 
18 scheler (1973, 339).
19 scheler (1973, 339).
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the evil-doer is directed. in other words, the family or a member of the 
offender’s family is seen as the very same offender, in which the family 
or the member in question puts itself as an organ.20 and when revenge is 
defined improperly as “objectless”, one wants to say only that revenge 
concerns, not an object circumscribed, but the whole environment in which 
the offence is been caused.21 A revenge objectless or without a definite object 
is already something else, and precisely, a form of ressentiment.22 The firm 
intentional character of revenge is just what makes of it something really 
different from a state of excitement.23 although it can have some reason, 
an explosion of anger or wrath e.g. can have only a vague object; it is rather 
a simple irritation due to a negative stimulus, a sudden and out of control 
episode. 
like in a sense of its body, besides, in revenge or in impulse of revenge a 
person feels its health and the risks that it could run in the future; it feels 
indeed its «life itself»24 and, in the vigour, that has however tragic effects 
when it flows into violence, its growth.
By synthesis, although revenge is neither a vital sense nor a sense of our 
body, it likens them very much. especially, in its pulse origin, that is to say, 
in impulse in which it announces itself, revenge betrays its vital nature. 
impulse of revenge, in fact, is a vital phenomenon analogue to “courage”, 
and is as such a «pulse reaction» or «pulse reaction response».25 
as we have seen, revenge refers to ego and has an intentional character. 
Consequently we can indeed inscribe it in the group of feelings in literal 
sense (gefühle).26 for “feelings in literal sense” i mean, with scheler, emotions, 
on the hand, and feelings of the personality or spiritual feelings (geistige gefühle) 
from the other. for its “wild” nature and for the pointed reasons, revenge is 
not a genuine spiritual feeling of course. for its reactive nature, and for the 
fact that it can be controlled, revenge is not even a genuine feeling of the 
personality, like bliss and despair, which, on the contrary, «spontaneously 
issues forth from the depth of our person»27 and is absolutely «beyond any 
volitional control».28 
20  Scheler (19725 b, 39-40).
21  Scheler (19725 b, 39-40).
22  Scheler (19725 b, 65).
23  See e.g. Scheler (20098, 263-264; 362)
24  Scheler (1973, 340).
25  Scheler (20098, 124).
26  Scheler (20098, 263). 
27  scheler (1973, 337).
28  scheler (1973, 337).
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“To be reactive”, besides, is not only opposite to “to be spontaneous”, 
but also to “to be active”. so revenge, as impulse, is different from other 
impulses, like impulse for defence or impulse for counter-attack that 
are, instead, active and aggressive.29 I find particularly interesting and 
instructive the distinction, apparently not much important, that scheler 
underlines between these impulses. any attempt at defence oneself e.g., 
above all when our life, or the well-being of a collectivity, is at stake, is 
positive and necessary und is preferable to passivity. “defence” has surely 
an adaptive valence, as the equivalent German word “Verteidigung” seems 
to reveal. its meaning includes that, too, of a “defence of own boundaries” or 
of a “fortress” and allude, consequently, to a an attempt at survival or self-
preservation inside those boundaries themselves. on the contrary, impulse 
of revenge, that has an adaptive valence too, does not exhaust yet in this 
sense. it points out an excess, a “surplus” of living body itself in comparison 
to the functions or reactions that usually one inclines to attribute it: to 
work essentially as an indicator of well-being, of dangers etc. it constitutes 
a confirmation of the fact that the living body is not at all anonym and able 
only to answer instinctively, but also to express itself beyond the universal 
needs of the species. living body can lie, can feel itself wounded or injured 
and can reacts to wrongs, can allude to a way of living with more dignity in 
comparison to that way of living (or to dye) to which an offender would have 
to reduce it. from this point of view, too, we see then, even if indistinctly, 
the underground line that passes dangerously from impulse of revenge to a 
kind of justice or at least to its claim. 
     
let’s remind a last aspect of revenge: this negative vital experience 
shares something of those specific vital reaction answers that consist 
in “to be glad or to be sad about something”. They are peculiar conducts, 
ways of behaving that have not a strong intentional character – and in 
this sense they distinguish themselves from revenge – but have however 
a fairly importance. They show that the value-qualities constitute 
certain understanding and meaning relations that «are not simply 
empirically contingent or dependent on the individual psychic causality of 
individuals30». These value-qualities relations «demand certain qualities in 
emotional “reaction of response of the same type, and these reactions in a 
certain sense “reach their goal” in the value-qualities»31. 
revenge has just a behavioural’s trait too. in a certain sense it belongs 
29  scheler (19725 b, 39).
30  scheler (1973, 258).
31  scheler (1973, 258).
THe fACTs “CAll DOWN VeNGeANCe”
roBerTa guccinelli member of the max Scheler gesellschaft
2.3.1. 
Impulse of 
Revenge is not 







(as affective impulse) to feeling’s class of the vital reaction answers or 
responses of behavioural’s type. in an another sense it is a “threshold-
phenomenon” because is already beyond the vital senses and the senses of 
our body, but is not yet a purely psychic feeling or an emotion of the soul: it 
is a psycho-physiologic emotion or rather is already «an emotion founded in 
a given state of affairs of negative value»32 and shares with retribution the 
“istance or «demande for atonement arising» from this state: 
 
Thus it appears to be the “spilled blood” itself that “cries out for atonement”, 
apart from any reference to a possible agent who could be the object of revenge 
or retribution. Both revenge and retribution, however, are equally founded in the 
experience of this demand…True, one who feels revenge seeks compensation for his 
harm as his harm, in contrast to one who demands retribution; but it does so because 
this harm also appears to demand atonement irrespective of his displeasure. it is 
for this reason alone that a deed for revenge can sometimes be felt as “duty”, and that 
even the lack of feeling of revenge can in certain cases be felt as a moral deficiency…
But the idea of punishment ist not based on revenge; it has its spiritual origins in 
retribution and demand for atonement.33
Keeping constantly in the mind the more general questions that I raised and 
the datum context, i can conclude provisionally:
Our capability of truthfulness begins from our living body
speaking of “truthfulness”, i do not mean to refer to a propositional truth 
of course, but to a “truth” before of the truth, of which we can be or not be 
able, and such as will condition not only the truth or the falsity of our 
judgements, but also that of our behaviours and conducts, our actions 
and our moral acts. There are truths or falsehoods, concerning sensory 
perception, that seem to depend on objects, as in cases in which a simple 
appearance pretends to be something that in reality is not34, like a wax 
statue or a manikin that seem to pretend e.g. to be a person. analogously 
there are truthfulness and falseness, concerning emotional-axiological, that 
seem to depend (and in actual fact depend) on our body. our body can lie 
and deceive us as when we believe to have forgiven an offender only because 
we do not feel, at vital level, any form of revenge or ressentiment towards 
it. Not always we realize that our generosity or our mildness as “sacrificial 
32  Scheler (1973, 362).
33  Scheler (1973, 362). I have changed some terms of the english translation e.g. the term 
“reprisal” with “retribution”. 
34  Scheler (19725 a, 226).
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lambs” is not really “our”, but it is due to a “blindness” of our body and of 
correlate feeling and emotions. what can be mistaken from the outside for 
an act that rises from an extreme sensitivity or true piety, is in reality the 
fruit of insensibility, of the “silence” and the “benumbment” of a body, and 
after all of a vital sense’s decline. This phenomenon is consequently very 
different from a hypocrisy that wears voluntarily a mask.
only a genuine, true forgiveness can “execute the revenge“ but - with the 
living scheler’s voice - «wer keinerlei rache fühlt, der kann ja auch nicht 
“verzeihen”…»35
Sensibility to injustices, adequately cultivated, contributes to our vital self-
sense, too, and of its health. it contributes to the identity of our living body. 
35  scheler (19725 b, 93).
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